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Abstract
Can individual preferences for public information among heterogeneous consumers be ag-
gregated into a meaningful social preference that does not suffer from Condorcet cycles? In a
Cournot model where homogeneous producers observe a public signal about an uncertain cost
of production prior to taking quantity decisions, we show that the majoritarian preference of
consumers for the precision of public information is fairly well behaved so that a Condorcet
winner always exists. Under a monotonicity condition on the demand function, we character-
ize the Condorcet-winning precision in terms of the demand function and the number of firms
under which the Condorcet-winning precision (i) hurts consumers’ surplus and profits or (ii)
remains conflict-free. These results have interesting implications on ‘collective’ Bayesian per-
suasion by agencies representing consumers, showing that when full transparency maximizes
expected consumers’ surplus, collective Bayesian persuasion can lead to full opacity, and vice
versa.
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Policy announcements, publication of economic data, or expert commentary in the media are some
of the main sources of public information about economic fundamentals that impact economy-wide
investment, output and prices. As put succinctly in Morris and Shin (2002), “[i]ndeed, for policy
makers in a variety of contexts, it is the ‘fundamentals’ information conveyed by public disclosures
that receives all the emphasis.” Understanding the impact of public information on utilitarian
welfare has therefore been the primary concern of normative economics (see a recent summary
of the literature on the social value of information in general by Pavan and Vives (2015)). The
purpose of the present paper is to look at markets with homogeneous producers but heterogeneous
consumers in order to study majoritarian preferences of consumers for public information and
contrast it with that which maximizes consumers’ surplus, profits, or utilitarian welfare. Taking a
positive approach to understanding what quality of information public institutions would provide
to industries is important if one wants to ask what kind of public information one would expect to
obtain when policy makers in a democracy give more importance to the likes and dislikes of the
majority. This is more so since political constraints, for instance, can compel governments into
instructing policy makers and heads of other economic institutions to discern not necessarily how
public information affects utilitarian welfare, but what impact it may have on the majority.
Studying preference aggregation of information for a group of heterogeneous consumers also
provides a better understanding of the social goals and ideologies of consumers as a whole, thereby
allowing us to study Bayesian persuasion undertaken by agencies that represent these consumers
to persuade the producers to serve the consumers’ collective objectives. In this regard, one needs
to identify common persuasion schemes for consumers without running into the usual difficulties of
preference aggregation. In particular, as majoritarian preferences often run into Condorcet cycles,
our primary task is to ask if the majoritarian preferences of consumers for public information
in markets are always well defined. And, if they are, then to identify the Condorcet winner for
public information, as a function of the prevailing market conditions – aggregate demand and the
number of competing producers – and to investigate conditions under which such information hurts
utilitarian welfare or initiates conflict between producers and consumers. Identifying the conflict
about public information between consumers and producers that we portray in the paper also helps
us understand better the fight over the control of an agency devoted to providing information about
economy-wide shocks.
In order to address these questions, we study a Cournot model of competition with one-sided het-
erogeneity. On the supply side of the market, a homogeneous group of profit-maximizing producers
faces a common shock to the cost of production about which they obtain noisy public information
prior to making individual quantity decisions. The precision of such information affects the noise
in the producers’ forecasts about the common and constant marginal cost of production (the fun-
damentals), which in turn affects the uncertainty over the realization of the resulting equilibrium
outcome – both in the spread and the mean of prices and quantities.1 Some of the main sources
1We keep the information structure as simple as possible (viz. binary states of uncertainty and binary signals)
without destroying the main message of the paper. We discuss in Section 6 the robustness of our main results to the
number of states and signals.
2
of ‘cost-affecting’ public information under direct or indirect government control include trade as-
sociations and forecasting markets. For instance, the FTC (Federal Trade Commission) in the US,
and its counterparts in many other countries, explicitly include, among their criteria for permitting
trade associations to collect and share information, the nature of the information exchanged, the
existing or likely future market power of the producers sharing the information, and whether anti-
competitive effects are outweighed by efficiency gains. Forecasting markets about inherent natural
volatilities (stock markets, weather, or climate), and domestic, international, or geopolitical events
(tax and trade policy, particularly from changes in governing parties or leaders, oil and energy
prices, or war) are other sources that affect cost uncertainty at the time of production decisions.
The government can influence these forecasting markets by defining the amount and type of data
that producers can amass, determining the level of investment in scientific and economic research
or even tacitly affecting the extent of press freedom through controlled communication with the
media. Moreover, the government at times finds itself uniquely positioned to generate forecasts
– for example about the economy-wide interest rates, to amass and propagate data regarding the
effectiveness of its policies, to implement policies that achieve one aim but also affect uncertainties
about industry-wide costs, and to provide public goods that facilitate data acquisition for predicting
natural accidents.2
On the demand side of the market, there is a continuum of risk-neutral consumers, each with a
unit demand for a homogeneous good. The consumers are heterogeneous in terms of the valuation of
the good, and the distribution of the individual valuations gives rise to a market demand. Since the
precision of public information determines the realizations of equilibrium market price, consumers
with different valuations may have conflicting preferences.3 For example, consider two information
structures where the first one leads to a larger minimum realizable price but a smaller expected
price than the second. A consumer with valuation greater than the maximum realizable price under
the first information structure prefers it over the second, as it gives the consumer a lower expected
price. On the other hand, a consumer with valuation less than the lowest realizable price under the
first information structure (so he does not purchase in this case) but greater than that under the
2 Interest rates are core prices in an economy, affecting cost, especially in the finance, insurance, real estate, and
any capital or export-intensive sector. Central banks set a base interest rate but cannot directly control the shape
of the yield curve. Rather, through the opacity or transparency of their announcements, they influence this shape.
For example, the Federal Reserve Bank (FED) and European Central Bank are significantly opaque, in contrast
to the Bank of England, which is quite transparent. In this sense, the central banks control the precision of public
information about events that they observe regarding future interest rates; committing to opacity or transparency has
implications for future interest rates and thereby for costs. While the FED and other central banks are independent
agencies that are supposedly isolated from political pressure, their goal is to serve the public interest; besides,
government objectives also impact their operations. As published openly on the FED website, “[t]he Federal Reserve
[...] is ultimately accountable to the public and the Congress. ... [I]n a democratic society it is appropriate that
operational independence is paired with central bank accountability to the public and its elected representatives. Clear
communications about the goals and strategy of monetary policy are also essential for enhancing the effectiveness of
systematic monetary policy because when the public and investors understand the goals of monetary policy, inflation
expectations are more likely to remain well anchored.”
3It is important at this stage to note that in our framework, the information need only be public amongst producers.
As it is a production shock, consumers do not react to information, but are affected by it only from the supply side
of the market, thus generating their individual preference for precision of such information.
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second information structure, prefers the second information structure.4
We find that the individual consumer preferences for public information satisfy a weaker version
of the ‘single-crossing property’ that also shares some features of ‘intermediate preferences’ á la
Grandmont (1978). Moreover, when these preferences are aggregated to determine the preferences
of agencies that represent consumers, the resulting majoritarian preference for such information
turns out to violate transitivity and continuity. Yet we find that it always guarantees a Condorcet
winner so that collective persuasion undertaken by such agencies remains well defined. We prove the
existence of a Condorcet-winning precision by first showing that the majoritarian preference for it is
complete, quasi-transitive (that is, its strict component is transitive), and satisfies a weak continuity
property, called Transfer-lower-continuity, first introduced in Mehta (1989) and later weakened by
Alcantud (2002) to obtain maximal elements of acyclic relations on compact sets. We then prove
that under a mild monotonicity restriction on the elasticity of the slope of the inverse demand
function, the Condorcet-winning precision is unique, being either complete or null, depending on
the properties of the demand function and the number of firms. We also characterize the precision
that maximizes the producers’ profits. In particular, we show that these are determined by: (i) the
degree of competition (i.e., number of producers in the market) and (ii) the elasticity of the slope
of the inverse demand. Among other things, we provide conditions under which the Condorcet-
winning precision for the consumers does not maximize consumers’ surplus and at the same time
remains in conflict with the producers’ objective of maximizing individual profits.
When it comes to price competition à la Bertrand, we find that producers remain indifferent
between different precisions and the majoritarian preference of consumers always selects complete
precision as the unique maximizer. However, irrespective of the demand and cost conditions, while
fully precise public information is found to be unanimously (weakly) preferred by all agents in
the market under Bertrand competition, either the consumers or the producers benefit from more
precise information under Cournot competition.
Some modelling features of our study need to be emphasized. We assume that the cost un-
certainty is faced publicly and all information about it is common. While producers do engage in
research with regards to demands and costs, there are aspects of the economy (such as oil shocks
and unforeseen interest-rate changes) about which the government or other organizations who im-
plement such policies, and who care about what the majority of consumers want, have considerable
information control. Our focus is on these ‘big-events’ as after all such events must be ‘politically
important,’ that is, affect the masses. If it comes to smaller events, perhaps the producers will
be better informed, but such information will be accessible to all producers. Thus, no individual
producer would obtain information that yields a more precise belief than what the other (identical)
producers would. One may ask why producers are not allowed to pay for the information. Our
4More precise information generates a spread of the realized prices, but the expected price may rise or fall and
need not be monotonic. Consumers with sufficiently high valuations who will purchase regardless of the realized
price care only about the expected price, whereas, those with somewhat low valuations care only about the minimum
realizable price. The disconnect between expected price and minimum realizable price can generate conflict among
consumers; moreover, because the realized prices also depend upon the mode of competition, cost uncertainty, and
demand, it is possible that some consumers’ preferences for information precision change with the environment, even
though their valuation for the good remains the same.
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results on producers’ preference over precision of public information gives us this willingness to
pay. As alluded to earlier, if there is a conflict of interest between producers and the majoritarian
consumer choice, the producer lobby will be willing to pay to choose the precision that maximizes
profits unless it is overwhelmed by the consumer lobby opposing it.
1.1 Related literature
We have explored an area that, to the best of our knowledge, is heretofore unexplored: namely, how
the interplay of market structure and mode of competition generates a well-defined majoritarian
preference of market participants for public information, possibly leading to conflict within and
across groups.5 There is of course a large literature that studies the impact of public informa-
tion on the utilitarian social welfare in environments such as investment games, product markets
and contests. Morris and Shin (2002) study the utilitarian social value of public information in
an investment game with quadratic-payoff, Gaussian information, and strategic complementarity.
Agents observe noisy private and public signals on the underlying fundamentals before making an
investment decision. They show that if agents have access to very precise private information, then
greater precision of public information is detrimental to welfare, as the coordination motive induces
agents to ‘overreact’ to public information. In our framework, there is no private information, or
to put it differently, the precision of private information is minimal, and yet we show that the
utilitarian value of public information can be negative, both for the consumers and for the produc-
ers, though, as mentioned earlier, at least one side of the market always benefits, in the aggregate,
from more precise information. Cornand and Heinemann (2008) decompose public information into
two components: precision of information and degree of publicity, and then show that information
should always be provided with maximum precision but, under certain conditions, to only some,
instead of all, market participants. Angeletos and Pavan (2007) develop a generalized investment
game of Morris and Shin to assess the value of information for a class of economies with network
externalities and strategic complementarity or substitutability. The information structure is de-
composed into accuracy and commonality to provide insightful explanations on how the precision
of information affects welfare. In particular, they show that public information can reduce wel-
fare, but only when coordination is socially undesirable. All these models feature ex ante identical
agents, and hence are not suitable for studying social preferences or conflicts in any interesting way.
There is an influential and extant body of work on the value of information in markets, although
it is silent about social preferences. Hirshleifer (1971) shows that the value of information in a
market can be negative when more precise information precludes mutually beneficial transactions
from occurring.6 Vives (1984) studies duopolies with uncertain linear demands and shows that only
5If it comes to public information controlled by some central authority, one can use the results obtained in this paper
to understand why economic players know what they know when the information source cares about majoritarian
preferences. A recent book by Veldkamp (2011) is also based on a similar theme about what information economic
agents expect to receive (and covers a wide range of applications), though the social choice aspect is missing.
6Our model is a particular branch of this tree, in that information affects the welfare of one group of agents who
transact with another group of agents, wherein the outcomes are identical whether or not the former group observes
the signal. Levine and Ponssard (1977) extend this to non-zero sum games, such as ours.
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in the case of substitutes in Cournot competition, producers’ strategic incentives to share private
information get reduced below what is socially optimal.7 Sakai and Yamato (1989) show that with
differentiated products, information sharing can also increase consumers’ surplus and, like us, relate
this to the number of producers. They show that both under perfect substitutes and under perfect
complements, and when producer-specific costs are non-positively correlated, information sharing
harms consumers; otherwise, the number of producers must be sufficiently large for information
sharing to benefit consumers.8
Others have demonstrated theoretical plausibilities of conflict between consumers and producers
in the aggregate. Shapiro (1986) studies Cournot oligopolies with homogeneous goods and producer-
specific uncertainty about costs. Under linear demand, he shows that sharing information increases
unconditional expected profits and welfare but reduces expected consumers’ surplus. Schlee (1996)
studies a monopoly where the consumers and the monopolist are uncertain about a good’s quality.
He shows, like us, that while the monopolist always prefers more precise public information about
quality, the consumers may or may not. Our results demonstrate that conflict in the aggregate
between producers and consumers can arise without either product differentiation or producer-
specific costs. Einy et al. (2002) show that even if the technology is common, private information is
beneficial only under constant returns to scale. Angeletos and Pavan (2007) report, as an application
of their general study, that in a Cournot duopoly with linear demands and quadratic costs, expected
industry profits increase with the precision of private information but can indeed decrease with the
precision of public information. We show that absent private information, public information can
only improve profits with linear demand and cost functions.
A few notable papers have found, like us, that the elasticity of the slope of the inverse demand
affects the value of public information. Einy et al. (2003) study Cournot duopoly with general
demands, constant returns to scale costs, and public information structures on demand and cost
uncertainties. They show that if Novshek’s (1985) equilibrium existence condition holds, then
under some additional mild restrictions on the curvature of the demand function, the value of
public information for the producers in a duopoly is positive. Their work is, however, silent on
consumers and not applicable to issues around the number of producers. Einy et al. (2017) study
n-player symmetric common-value Tullock contests with incomplete information in which a player’s
cost of effort is the product of a random variable and a deterministic real function of effort. They
too find an important role played by the elasticity of the slope of the inverse demand. In particular,
they find that if this curvature is increasing, then the value of public information for the contestants
is nonnegative. While contests have an association with Cournot games, the consumer side of the
framework is absent and so informational conflict across groups is not applicable.
As mentioned earlier, our framework also contributes to the literature on Bayesian persuasion.
Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) characterize optimal persuasion where a single sender of informa-
7See, for example, Novshek and Sonnenschein (1982), Basar and Ho (1974), Clarke (1983), Gal-Or (1985) and Sakai
(1985) for more on producers’ incentives to share private information; see Vives (1990) on how these incentives are
affected by public disclosures of trade associations. Li et al. (1987) show that when producers are uncertain about
the intercepts of linear demands and undertake private research to obtain information before choosing quantities,
inefficiencies persist.
8See also Raith (1996) for a survey on the value of private information in markets.
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tion persuades a single receiver to take an action closer to the sender’s ideal point. Since then, this
literature has evolved in two main directions. Kamenica and Gentzkow (2017) and Li and Norman
(2018) look at multiple competing senders while Schnakenberg (2015), Alonso and Camara (2017)
and Ghosh, Postl and Roy (2018) study multiple receivers of information. A relatively open ques-
tion is whether collective decision-making processes that determine the functioning of representative
agencies can deliver a sophisticated information design that an independent individual sender can
deliver or would such processes make a well-defined information design difficult to achieve. In this
sense, we identify a natural realm in which to study the question: collective decisions by hetero-
geneous consumers (through representative agencies) affecting the public information available to
a group of competing producers. Since such information determines consumer welfare, we may
expect consumers, who constitute powerful lobbying bodies, to choose how to deliver this informa-
tion strategically, but first by resolving any conflict that may exist among themselves. We show
that the existence of a natural focal point for such collective persuasion is non-trivial as we find
that the majoritarian preferences for information for consumers may neither be transitive nor con-
tinuous, but that for sufficiently general market conditions, they yield a maximizer that gives us
the Condorcet-winning persuasion mechanism. Moreover, we find that this representative persua-
sion mechanism does not necessarily benefit the consumers in the aggregate. Therefore, collective
persuasion through a representative agency is somewhat tricky.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 studies the
majoritarian preference of consumers and Section 4 determines the precision of information that
maximizes profits. We provide a summary of our results in Section 5 with implications for conflict
over public information where we also briefly mention our observations for price competition á la
Bertrand. The paper concludes in Section 6. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 Model
We study a market with a continuum of consumers who have heterogeneous valuations for a ho-
mogeneous good. The good is supplied á la Cournot by a finite number of producers who face
a common shock to their cost of production. Information about this uncertainty is disseminated
publicly and prior to the individual quantity choices of the producers. We now describe this envi-
ronment formally.
Consumers: A market for homogeneous goods comprises a continuum of consumers with valuations
v ∈ R+ for a unit of the good. Let I be the set of consumers indexed by i, where each consumer
buys at most one unit of the good if the price does not exceed his valuation. Consumers are risk
neutral, their utility from purchase equals their valuation net of price, and they obtain zero payoff
from no purchase. The cumulative distribution of consumer valuations is a mapping F : R+ → [0, 1]
that yields the inverse demand function for the good p : R+ → R+ with 1− F (p(x)) = x, the total
quantity demanded in the market. We assume p(·) ∈ C3. Formally, let BR+ be the Borel σ-algebra
on R+ and µ the Lebesgue measure on BR+ . Then the measure of consumers with valuations in
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Quantity-setting producers: There are n ≥ 1 producers indexed by j, who supply the good by
independently and simultaneously setting individual quantities qj ≥ 0. Each producer has zero fixed
cost and a common, constant, and ex-ante unknown marginal cost c ∈ {cl, ch}, with 0 < cl < ch.




denote the elasticity of the slope of the inverse demand (or the Arrow-Pratt curvature of the
demand function). We restrict attention to demand functions where the marginal revenue is strictly
decreasing: 2p′(x) + xp′′(x) < 0, i.e. r(x) < 2, so that with constant marginal costs, existence (and
uniqueness) of (symmetric) Nash equilibrium in the oligopoly is guaranteed for an arbitrary number
of producers n (see for example, Vives (1999, page 99, Eq. (4.2)) and Seade (1980)).
Public information: Before each producer makes its production decision, all producers observe a
binary public signal s ∈ {sl, sh} about c. We let λ ∈ Λ = [1/2, 1] denote the precision of these
signals, that is, λ = prob(sl|cl) = prob(sh|ch). We assume that the entropy of prior information
about c is maximum – i.e., cl and ch are equally likely – so that differences in our metrics for the
value of a more precise signal arise solely due to the precision of the signal, and not by how likely
a particular signal is expected to be observed.
Quantities and payoffs: Let Q =
∑n
j=1 qj be the total output in the market, cleared at price
p(Q) ≥ 0. We write Q = qj + Q−j to single out producer j in this aggregation, qj denoting
producer j’s individual output, where for a monopoly (viz. n = 1), we set Q−j = 0. The profit of
producer j in state c ∈ {cl, ch} is
πj(qj , Q−j |c) = (p(qj +Q−j)− c)qj .
The net returns to the consumers depend solely on p(Q) once each producer has determined its qj ,
and not upon the realized c. Hence, the utility of a consumer with valuation v is max{0, v− p(Q)},
as such a consumer purchases the good if and only if v ≥ p(Q).
The above environment gives rise to a Bayesian Cournot game. We study symmetric Bayes-
Nash equilibrium properties of the game for a given λ ∈ Λ and ask if the majoritarian preference
of the consumers over the set Λ is well defined. We then characterize the Condorcet winner for the
consumers and profit-maximizing choice of the (identical) producers over Λ.
2.1 Public information and market equilibrium
Upon observing the public signal s, each producer chooses its individual output. This leads to a
binary gamble over realized profits since, once the outputs are chosen, each producer realizes the
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actual marginal cost c that determines its profit. In this sense, before observing s, each producer
faces a compound lottery, where the first uncertainty comes from the signal the producers observe
jointly. We will say then that the binary gamble yields conditional expected profit, (certain)
consumers’ payoffs, and (certain) price; the compound lottery then yields unconditional expected
profit, expected consumers’ surplus, and expected price.
We will throughout use E(y) to denote the mathematical expectation of the random variable
y and E(y|Z) to denote this expectation conditional on an event Z. Since a priori information is
null, we have prob(cl|sl) = λ and prob(cl|sh) = 1 − λ. These yield E(c|sl) = λcl + (1 − λ)ch and
E(c|sh) = (1 − λ)cl + λch. Thus, ∂E(c|sl)∂λ = −
∂E(c|sh)
∂λ = cl − ch < 0. Let qj(sh;λ) and qj(sl;λ) be
the quantities produced by producer j upon observing sh and sl, respectively – for brevity, when
λ is clear, we write these as qj(sh) and qj(sl). Then, market quantities are Q(sh) and Q(sl), with
market-clearing prices p(Q(sh)) and p(Q(sl)). Upon observing the signal s ∈ {sl, sh}, producer j’s
optimal output q∗j (s) solves
p′(q∗j (s) +Q−j)q
∗
j (s) + p(q
∗
j (s) +Q−j) ≡ E(c|s).
In the unique symmetric equilibrium, q∗1(s) = q
∗




p′(nq∗(s))q∗(s) + p(nq∗(s)) ≡ E(c|s). (1)
The following lemma shows that more precise public information leads to a larger spread in equi-
librium prices. The basic intuition here is that a low signal sl induces a common belief that the
cost will be low hence yielding a smaller expected cost as the precision of the signal is greater. This
increases the equilibrium response in output from each firm, thus lowering the market price. The
opposite happens when the signal received is sh.
Lemma 1 An increase in the precision of public signals λ increases (decreases) equilibrium output
and decreases (increases) equilibrium price when s = sl (s = sh).
3 Majoritarian preference of consumers
For each i ∈ I, let %i be consumer i’s preference ordering over Λ under the assumption that for
each λ ∈ Λ, the consequent market is in equilibrium defined by (1). As each λ is then associated
with a unique equilibrium price-gamble, %i is represented by consumer i’s expected utility in the
following way. Recall that the probability of obtaining the signal sl is
1
2 . Given λ, λ
′ ∈ Λ, λ %i λ′








(max{0, vi − p(nq∗(sl;λ′))}+ max{0, vi − p(nq∗(sh;λ′))}).
The precision of public information about industry-wide uncertain costs affects equilibrium quan-
tities supplied by the individual producers, thereby affecting the spread in the ex-ante distribution







As consumers have heterogeneous valuations of the good, their preferences over the precision of
the signal are non-trivial: a consumer with sufficiently high valuation who purchases the product
irrespective of which price prevails will prefer to lower the expected price; a consumer with low
valuation will prefer a greater spread in prices without caring about the expected price, so that she
may have a chance to buy the good in at least one realization. The preference relations %i are not
necessarily single-peaked for general demand functions. However, they satisfy the following property
that is similar to, but weaker than, the ‘Single-Crossing Property’: for any pair of precisions λ < λ′
and any pair of consumers with valuations vj > vi, if λ i λ′ and λ j λ′ then λ k λ′ for every
consumer with valuation vk ∈ (vi, vj).9
Given this preference-heterogeneity amongst consumers over Λ, we move to the analysis of
preference aggregation. In doing so, we focus on the majoritarian preference of consumers and
interpret it as the preferences of the representative agencies for the consumers. Let %maj be the
majoritarian preference of consumers over Λ. Then, for any λ, λ′ ∈ Λ, we have λ %maj λ′ if and
only if m({i ∈ I|λ i λ′}) ≥ m({i ∈ I|λ′ i λ}). We say that %maj is complete if for any λ, λ′ ∈ Λ,
either λ %maj λ′ or λ′ %maj λ. We say that %maj is quasi-transitive if its strict component maj
is transitive, that is, given λ, λ′, λ′′ ∈ Λ, λ maj λ′ and λ′ maj λ′′ together imply λ maj λ′′. For
each λ ∈ Λ, denote the Strict Lower Contour set of λ under %maj as L%maj (λ) = {λ′ ∈ Λ|λ maj λ′}
and by L̊%maj (λ) its interior. We say that maj is transfer-lower-continuous if for each λ ∈ Λ such
that λ′ maj λ for some λ′ ∈ Λ, there exists λ′′ ∈ Λ such that λ ∈ L̊%maj (λ′′). Finally, a Condorcet-
winning precision for the consumers is a maximum of %maj over Λ. Thus, λ ∈ Λ is a Condorcet
winner if for each λ′ ∈ Λ \ {λ}, we have λ %maj λ′.
Proposition 1 proves that the majoritarian preference of the consumers is complete, quasi-
transitive and transfer-lower-continuous, and consequently has a maximum.
Proposition 1 The ordering %maj is complete, quasi-transitive, and transfer-lower-continuous
over Λ. Consequently, a Condorcet-winning precision for the consumers exists.
When aggregating individual preferences, we find that the majoritarian preference need not be
transitive (see Remark 2 in the Appendix). This surprising result is due to the following. Consider
three precisions 12 ≤ λ1 < λ2 < λ3 ≤ 1 and suppose that when making a pairwise comparison, λ1
and λ3 obtain the same support among consumers and so do λ2 and λ3. This means, λ1 ∼maj λ3
and λ2 ∼maj λ3. It follows then that λ1 and λ2 must generate the same expected price, that is,
9Grandmont (1978) proved that in general, Condorcet cycles are avoided if preferences of individuals satisfy
continuity and ‘Intermediateness’. In the language of the present model, intermediateness of consumers’ preferences
holds if, in addition to the above condition (that holds in our model), one has the following: for any pair of precisions
λ < λ′ and any pair of consumers with valuations vj > vi if (a) λ %i λ′ and λ %j λ′ then λ %k λ′ and if (b) λ ∼i λ′
and λ j λ′ (or λ i λ′ and λ ∼j λ′) then λ k λ′ for every consumer with valuation vk ∈ (vi, vj). These two
additional conditions are not satisfied for our consumers. To see this, consider two information structures: λ = 1/2
and λ = 1. Suppose E(p∗;λ = 1/2) < E(p∗;λ = 1). Consider three consumers: Consumer i whose valuation is
below pl(λ = 1), Consumer j whose valuation is above ph(λ = 1), and Consumer k whose valuation is in the interval
(pl(λ = 1), pl(λ = 1/2)). Then
1
2
∼i 1 (as i is always out of the market), 12 j 1 (as j is always in the market but
since E(p∗;λ = 1/2) < E(p∗;λ = 1), she prefers null information). However, 1 k 12 since she is always out of the
market when λ = 1/2 but makes a purchase when λ = 1 and s = sl.
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E(p∗;λ1) = E(p
∗;λ2). By Claim 1 (see Appendix) however, we conclude that λ2 maj λ1, as the
two precisions generate the same expected price, but λ2 induces a lower equilibrium price when sl is
observed. Transitivity fails here as two distinct precisions may each lead to majoritarian indifference
with a third, greater, precision, as only the expected price induced by each of the smaller precisions
determines its relative support among consumers – the spread of equilibrium prices plays no role in
either comparison. But when comparing the two smaller precisions that induce the same expected
price, the more precise of the two strictly majority-dominates. This is because the high-valuation
consumers are indifferent between the two precisions, while the low-valuation consumers strictly
prefer the more precise one as it leads to a lower equilibrium price when the low signal is observed.10
In addition, the majoritarian preference may fail to be continuous (see Remark 3 in the Ap-
pendix) as demonstrated below. Start from a situation with two precisions 12 ≤ λ1 < λ2 ≤ 1 such
that E(p∗;λ1) = E(p
∗;λ2). In this case, a majority strictly prefers the greater precision λ2, as
high-valuation consumers (those with vi ≥ p(nq∗(sh);λ2)) are indifferent between the two preci-
sions, and consumers with vi ∈ (p(nq∗(sl);λ2), p(nq∗(sh);λ2)) strictly prefer λ2 over λ1. Suppose a
small perturbation of λ1 leads to a lower expected price: E(p
∗;λ1 + ε) < E(p
∗;λ2). While λ1 + ε
is still less precise than λ2, we could potentially see a reversal in the majoritarian preference, as
high-valuation consumers, who were indifferent between λ1 and λ2, now strictly prefer λ1 + ε over
λ2. Accordingly, even though the expected price E(p
∗;λ) is continuous in the precision of public
information λ, high-valuation consumers’ strict preference over lower expected prices could lead to
a discontinuity in the majoritarian preference. However, we show that despite this possibility, the
majoritarian preference always satisfies transfer-lower continuity as in Mehta (1989) where when-
ever such discontinuity appears, one can find another precision that is majority-preferred to all
precisions close to λ1 + ε. With this property – along with completeness and quasi-transitivity of
the majoritarian preference – we invoke Theorem 4 in Mehta (1989) to show that the majoritarian
preference of consumers for the precision of public information always has a maximum. Of course,
the maximum is then the Condorcet winner.
3.1 The Condorcet winner
Proposition 1 establishes that a Condorcet-winning precision for consumers exists. However, ob-
taining a clear characterization of the set of Condorcet winners for arbitrary demand functions is
generally hard. In the rest of the paper, we will assume that the elasticity of the slope of the inverse
demand r(x) is monotonic, that is, either for each x ∈ R+, r′(x) ≥ 0 or for each x ∈ R+, r′(x) < 0.
Using monotonicity of r(·), we next show (viz. Proposition 2) that the Condorcet winner is unique,
and we identify it. The following Lemma is useful as it relates the Arrow-Pratt curvature r(·) of
the demand function with the expected equilibrium price that plays a central role in Proposition 2.
10 Sen (1969) shows that quasi-transitivity of preference relations implies the existence of maximal elements over
finite sets of alternatives. Hence, if we restrict attention to a finite set of admissible public precisions, then we can
readily establish the existence of Condorcet winners without resorting to any continuity condition as we show that
the majority preference is complete and quasi-transitive.
11
Lemma 2 The expected equilibrium price E(p∗;λ) is decreasing w.r.t. λ if r′ > 0, increasing w.r.t.
λ if r′ < 0 and constant w.r.t. λ if r′ = 0.
The intuition behind the above lemma is as follows. We know that an increase in λ induces
a mean-preserving spread in E(c). Whether this in turn induces a mean-preserving spread in
equilibrium price p∗ depends upon how r changes. Specifically, the spread so induced in p∗ is
mean-preserving if and only if r′ = 0. Otherwise, equilibrium price is more (less) sensitive at higher
marginal cost than at lower marginal cost when r′ > 0 (r′ < 0). This then generates the movement
of the expected price.
Let us now fix the number of producers n in the market. Consider the two extreme information
structures: λ = 1/2 and λ = 1. Let v 1
2
1(n) ∈ [p(nq∗(sh;λ = 1/2)), p(nq∗(sh;λ = 1))] be the

















∗;λ = 1/2)− p(nq∗(sl;λ = 1)).
Thus, v 1
2
1(n) partitions the consumers into two groups, and we denote the difference in the measures












We are now in a position to characterize the consumers’ Condorcet-winning precision of public
information. Proposition 2 shows that the monotonicity of r yields a unique Condorcet-winning
precision. In particular, when r′ > 0, then the Condorcet winner is unambiguously the full-precision
(λ = 1); however when r′ < 0, its identity is nuanced and depends on whether the number of
consumers who prefer λ = 1/2 is greater or less than those who prefer λ = 1, reflected by the sign
of L(n).
Proposition 2 (i) If r′ ≥ 0, then the Condorcet winner is λ = 1 ; (ii) If r′ < 0, then the Condorcet
winner is λ = 1 if L(n) > 0 and λ = 12 if L(n) < 0.
In the following two subsections, we discuss the conditions on the demand that warrant a unique
Condorcet winner, relate this characterization with the Median Voter Theorem, and ask if and how
the identity of the winner changes with the number of producers.
3.1.1 Demand conditions, unique Condorcet winner and the median voter theorem
An individual consumer’s preference for public information depends not only on his valuation of
the good, but also on the distribution of valuations of others and on the number of producers. If
these change, then some consumers will have different preferences, including those whose valuation
did not change in the process. As noted earlier, the precision of public information determines the
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spread of equilibrium prices, which in turn determines consumer participation (purchase or not).
When the public signal is completely uninformative (λ = 1/2), each producer’s output decision
is independent of the signal it receives; thus, there is no price uncertainty. As the public signal
becomes more precise, the production decision is more responsive to the observed signal, and hence
the spread of equilibrium prices increases.
With r′ > 0, the expected equilibrium price decreases when information becomes more precise
(Lemma 2). Consumers weakly benefit from the improved precision of the information. Those
with high valuations always make a purchase, regardless of the precision and signal realization,
so they strictly benefit from the decrease in the expected price; their preference for precision is
single-peaked. Those with low valuations either never make a purchase, or make a purchase only
when the low-cost signal is realized. They are strictly better off with the improved precision of the
information, as the equilibrium price with a low-cost signal decreases with the informativeness of the
signal, unless vi ≤ p∗(sl;λ = 1) as such consumers are always out of the market. So, barring those
with vi ≤ p∗(sl;λ = 1), such consumers also have single-peaked preferences. Finally, more precise
information increases the equilibrium price with the high-cost signal. Those with valuations between
the two high-cost equilibrium prices, one for each precision, switch from purchase to not purchase
when the high-cost signal is realized under greater precision. However, given that the expected price
decreases, the net utility gain from a lower equilibrium price when the low-cost signal is realized
outweighs the loss from not purchasing when the high-cost signal is realized. Accordingly, they
strictly benefit from the improved precision of information, and again their preferences are single-
peaked. This means that there is unanimity among consumers: more precise information is strictly
preferred by everyone other than those with very low valuations as they never purchase and hence
are indifferent about λ. As a consequence, λ = 1 (complete information) is the Condorcet winner.
Also, ignoring (a) consumers with valuations vi ≤ p∗(sl;λ = 1) and (b) consumers, constituting
a set of measure zero, who are indifferent between λ = 1/2 and λ = 1, each %i is single-peaked.
Therefore, the median consumer is always well defined: the location of the indifferent consumers
under (b) determines the strict preference of the median consumer. We conclude that the Condorcet
winner is the median consumer’s ideal precision.
Unanimity among consumers breaks down when r′ < 0. In this case, as information becomes
more precise, both the spread of equilibrium prices and the expected equilibrium price increase.
Consumers with high valuations now strictly prefer less precise information, as the expected price is
increasing in λ. On the other hand, consumers with low valuations, except for whom vi ≤ p∗(sl;λ =
1), strictly prefer more precise information, as it gives them a chance to purchase when the low-cost
signal is realized or to purchase at a lower price; they are indifferent to the increase in the price
when the high-cost signal is observed since the resulting price continues to exceed their valuation.
For those with valuations in between, we show that they prefer more precise information when the
valuation is below v 1
2
1(n), but less precise information when the valuation is above it. A consumer
with valuation v 1
2
1(n) is indifferent between complete information (λ = 1) and null information
(λ = 1/2), as the expected utilities under both precisions are the same for him.11 Thus, the
11Since such a consumer would not purchase under complete information if sh is observed, complete information
leaves him better off from the resulting lower equilibrium price when sh is observed, which occurs half as often as
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Condorcet winner is either 1 or 1/2 depending on the relative mass between the high-valuation and
low-valuation consumers as evinced by the sign of the expression L(n) which is the lead in support
for λ = 1 against λ = 1/2. As before, ignoring those consumers with valuations vi ≤ p∗(sl;λ = 1),
consumer preferences are single-peaked and the Condorcet winner is the median consumer’s ideal
precision.
3.1.2 Condorcet Winner and the Number of Producers
The Condorcet-winning precision of public information can change with the degree of competitive-
ness in the market. To see this, notice that the change in the first term of L(n) w.r.t. n is the mass
of consumers whose valuations are low enough to enter the market when sl is observed and there
are more producers, and the change in the second term w.r.t. n is (twice) the mass of consumers
whose preferences switch from complete to null information. In other words, as n increases, some
consumers’ preferences for λ change. Thus, L′(n) need not equal 0 because some consumers who
were priced out of the market no longer are, and other consumers’ preferences switch since the
expected price is greater with λ = 1.
As we have noted above, when r′ ≥ 0, the expected price is weakly decreasing in λ and the
Condorcet winner is λ = 1. In this case the consumers are also unanimous in their preferences. So
conflict among consumers can only arise when r′ < 0. In that case, a full characterization of the
identity of the Condorcet winner, as the number of producers n changes, is again a difficult task in
a model as general as ours since the identity of v 1
2
1(n) depends on equilibrium values that in turn
depend on n. In what follows, we will provide some partial characterization.
Proposition 3 Suppose r′ < 0. (i) There exists N∗ such that for all n > N∗, p−1(cl) > 2p
−1(ch)
implies that the Condorcet winner is λ = 1, whereas p−1(cl) < 2p
−1(ch) implies that the Condorcet
winner is λ = 1/2. (ii) If, in addition, we have p′′(x) > 0, r > 1 and p−1(cl) > 2p
−1(ch), then the
Condorcet winner is λ = 1 for all n ≥ 1.
The first part of Proposition 3 shows that when a sufficiently large number of producers compete
in markets with demand functions satisfying r′ < 0, the Condorcet winner is λ = 1 when the impact
of the unknown state on the dispersion between the low and the high costs is large while it is λ = 1/2
when this impact is small. But under what conditions would one expect majoritarian consumer
preference to keep the industry completely informed (viz. λ = 1) irrespective of the number of
competitors? This is addressed in the second part. It shows that in addition, if the demand is
convex and the elasticity of the slope of the inverse demand is larger than one, the Condorcet
winner is λ = 1 for any number of producers provided the impact of the unknown state on the
dispersion between the low and the high costs is sufficiently large.
purchasing under null information.
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3.2 Maximizing Consumers’ Surplus



















− p(Q∗(sl))Q∗(sl) − p(Q∗(sh))Q∗(sh)
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and note that ρ < 0 and
∂ρ
∂n < 0. Lemma 3 shows that the expected Consumers’ Surplus is
monotonic in the precision λ although the direction of this monotonicity is dependent on the
whether r′ is smaller or larger than ρ(x, n). Denote by Qduo the total equilibrium output in a
duopoly when λ = 1 and sh is observed – this is the minimum quantity produced, given the
demand and cost structure, in an oligopoly (viz. Q∗(·) = nq∗(·) ≥ Qduo).
Lemma 3 In a market with n ≥ 1 producers, (a) if for each x ∈ [Qduo, p−1(cl)] we have r′(x) <
ρ(x, n) then, E(S|λ) is decreasing in λ so that the expected Consumers’ Surplus-maximizing pre-
cision is λ = 1/2 and (b) if for each x ∈ [Qduo, p−1(cl)] we have r′(x) > ρ(x, n) then, E(S|λ) is
increasing in λ so that the expected Consumers’ Surplus-maximizing precision is λ = 1.
Although more precise information generates a mean-preserving spread in expected marginal
cost that manifests in a mean-preserving spread in prices, since q(sl) > q(sh), the positive effect on
consumers’ surplus from the decrease in p(sl) outweighs the negative effect on consumers’ surplus
from the equal increase in p(sh). Thus, expected consumers’ surplus decreases with λ only if r
′ is
sufficiently negative so that the latter effect dominates.
4 Public information and profits
In a model with homogeneous goods and common shocks, producer preferences over the set of
precisions Λ are identical. So denote by E(π|λ) the unconditional expected profit (or simply,
profit) of an individual producer in the symmetric equilibrium. Then




{q∗(sl)[p(Q∗(sl))− E(c|sl)] + q∗(sh)[p(Q∗(sh))− E(c|sh)]}
For n ≥ 2, define
ρ̄(x, n) =
(2− r(x))(n+ 1− r(x))
(n− 1)x
and note that ρ̄(x, n) > 0.
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Proposition 4 (i) Monopoly profit increases unambiguously in the precision of public information
λ so that the profit-maximizing precision is λ = 1; (ii) In an oligopoly with n ≥ 2 producers, (a)
if for each x ∈ [Qduo, p−1(cl)] we have r′(x) < ρ̄(x, n) then, E(π|λ) is increasing in λ so that the
profit maximizing-precision is λ = 1 while (b) if for each x ∈ [Qduo, p−1(cl)] we have r′(x) > ρ̄(x, n)
then, E(π|λ) is decreasing in λ so that the profit-maximizing precision is λ = 1/2.
Part (i) is intuitive. The monopolist is the sole producer and therefore the effect of more precise
information on profit is solely due to facilitating the producer to more closely align its output with
the state of the world. This is seen clearly by looking at the first derivative of the unconditional
expected profit w.r.t. λ. As proved in the Appendix, this derivative, for a fixed n ≥ 1, reduces to:
∂E(π)
∂λ





















In a monopoly (n = 1), the first term vanishes and what remains is what we call the alignment
effect. Note that it is always positive – an increase in λ induces a mean-preserving spread in the
expected marginal cost, which implies that, as the value function is convex in c, the realization
of the value function is increasing in λ. However, in an oligopoly (n ≥ 2), the first term comes
into play. As the signal is public, information has an additional effect on each producer’s profit in
that more precise information not only allows the producer to better align its production to the
state of the world, but also results in all other producers doing likewise. Thus, when producers
observe sl, a larger λ results in each producer increasing its q(sl) more than it would with a smaller
λ, thereby resulting in a greater decrease in each producer’s residual demand. Similarly, when
producers observe sh, their output choices are smaller the greater is λ, yielding a greater residual
demand compared with sh being observed with a smaller λ. This combination of the smaller and
larger residual demands when sl and sh are observed with a greater λ, constitutes the competition
effect.12 This competition effect counteracts, or possibly augments, the alignment effect. Thus, the
characterization of the expected profit-maximizing λ is qualified. There is a critical value of r′ < 0
at which the competition effect vanishes – which is to say that the effects of more precise information
on ex ante expected profit through the residual demand that the producer faces, are offset. For
r′ smaller than this, the competition effect is actually positive and augments the alignment effect.
However, for r′ sufficiently positive, the competition effect is large enough to negate the alignment
effect, yielding zero value of more precise information for producers – this occurs at ρ̄(x, n). For r′
greater, the competition effect outweighs the alignment effect. Regardless, except for r′ = ρ̄(x, n),
either the sum of the two effects is positive, or negative, for all λ, yielding extreme preferences






is necessarily positive, yielding a negative competition
effect (see (2)). Though the prices undergo a mean-preserving spread with greater λ, and so also the difference with
expected cost is mean-preserving, conditional expected profit undergoes a mean-decreasing spread.
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for producers. Lastly, since the equilibrium prices and quantities also depend upon the number of
producers, the critical threshold ρ̄(x, n) itself depends on n – that is, much like consumers, there
are some distributions of valuations such that, the value of more precise information is positive or
negative depending upon the number of producers.
5 Conflict over public precision
The Cournot model we have analyzed is fairly general on the demand side, though admittedly
elementary when it comes to costs. This simplicity has enabled us to derive a number of clean
results on majoritarian preferences for public information that now place us in a position to look
at conflict among consumers, as well as across consumers and producers. As the heterogeneity of
consumer valuations is key to our analysis, we will represent conflict in terms of the distribution of
these valuations, that is, in the space of demand functions, characterized by the responsiveness of
Arrow-Pratt curvature r to aggregate quantity.
When does the Condorcet-winning precision of information for consumers disagree with that
which maximizes utilitarian welfare of the consumers? It is possible that the maximization of
consumers’ surplus leaves some, or even a majority of, consumers worse off either because of (i)
the absence of non-distortionary transfers, (ii) a missing market where consumers could trade
based upon the signal realization, or (iii) that such markets exist in principle but the public signal
is not observed by the consumers. Hence, the Condorcet-winning precision of information may
be detrimental to expected consumer surplus. Proposition 5 reports conditions under which the
majoritarian precision and that determined by maximizing expected consumers’ surplus are in
conflict. It shows that this conflict does not exist for demands where r increases in aggregate
quantity but arises otherwise. Importantly, it highlights the fact that the disagreement can occur
both when the Condorcet winner is 1/2 or 1; in other words, when full transparency maximizes
expected consumers’ surplus, collective Bayesian persuasion through a representative consumer
agency can lead to full opacity with regards to cost uncertainty, and vice versa.
Proposition 5 Disagreement between the Condorcet winner and the expected consumers’ surplus
maximizer occurs only if r′ < 0. In particular, (i) if for each x ∈ [Qduo, p−1(cl)] we have 0 > r′ >
ρ(x, n) and L(n) < 0, then the Condorcet winner is λ = 1/2 and the expected consumers’ surplus
maximizer is λ = 1; whereas (ii) if for each x ∈ [Qduo, p−1(cl)] we have r′ < ρ(x, n) and L(n) > 0,
then the Condorcet winner is λ = 1 and the expected consumers’ surplus maximizer is λ = 1/2.
Majoritarian social choice does not capture the strength of preferences, and so the notion of a Gor-
man representative agent does not apply. Nevertheless, many regulatory agencies have a criterion
to maximize expected consumers’ surplus. That the Condorcet-winning and the expected consumer
surplus-maximizing precisions of public information may conflict then is not surprising. A full pic-
ture of conflict (or lack of it) between consumers’ surplus, the Condorcet winner and producers’
objectives is represented in the following summarizing table (values of respective λ’s are in red).
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r′ < ρ 1/2 if L(n) < 0; 1 if L(n) > 0 1/2 1
ρ < r′ < 0 1/2 if L(n) < 0; 1 if L(n) > 0 1 1
0 < r′ < ρ̄ 1 1 1
ρ̄ < r′ 1 1 1/2
The following key points come out from our analysis on quantity competition. For linear demands,
the Condorcet winner for the consumers is the unanimous choice of λ = 1 that therefore maximizes
expected consumers’ surplus; it also maximizes expected industry profits. If r′ ≥ 0 then, not only
is the Condorcet winner for the consumers λ = 1, it is unanimous among consumers and maximizes
expected consumers’ surplus. Moreover, there is no conflict with the producers provided that
r′ < ρ̄; otherwise, the producers prefer null information. Although this conflict across consumers
and producers does not exist in a monopoly, ρ̄ decreases as n increases, expanding the range
of r′ for which conflict arises in oligopolies. If r′ < 0, then there is always conflict among the
consumers (that is, there is always a positive measure of consumers who oppose the Condorcet
winner) and there is always a situation when the Condorcet winner does not maximize expected
consumers’ surplus: (a) if r′ < ρ, then null information maximizes expected consumers’ surplus,
and this is also the Condorcet winner for the consumers if and only if L(n) < 0; (b)if r′ > ρ
then complete information maximizes expected consumers’ surplus, and this is also the Condorcet
winner for the consumers if and only if L(n) > 0; and (c) conflict in the aggregate between producers
and consumers emerges only when either the Condorcet winner or the expected consumers’ surplus
maximizer is null information. Only if r′ ≥ 0 does there exist a precision level λ that is unanimously
preferred by the consumers, and it is that of complete information; only if 0 ≤ r′ < ρ̄ does there
exist a λ that is unanimously preferred by all agents – consumers and producers together, and it
is that of complete information (λ = 1); there is no other possibility for the Condorcet-winning
public information to be unanimously preferred by all agents in the market. And finally, for
any distribution of valuations (that is, demand function) and cost conditions, at least one side of
the market (i.e., either the producers or the consumers) always benefits from more precise public
information.
To complete our study, we end this section with a short comparative look at price competition.
Remark 1 (Price competition) Consider price competition á la Bertrand where after observing
the public signal s ∈ {sl, sh}, but before knowing the state, the producers simultaneously set prices
pj ≥ 0 and commit to supply any demand at the announced price. As goods are homogeneous, in the
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unique symmetric equilibrium, the market price is p∗(s) = E(c|s), s ∈ {sl, sh}. The expected profit is
always zero under price competition and therefore, the producers are indifferent toward the precision
of information. This rules out conflict across consumers and producers. What about conflict among
consumers? While the expected equilibrium market price E(p∗(s)) = (E(c | sl) + E(c | sh))/2 =
(cl + ch)/2 is independent of the precision of public information λ, a higher λ induces a mean-
preserving spread in p∗(s). Accordingly, all consumers with valuations greater than ch or less than
cl are indifferent toward the precision of public information, but consumers with valuations between
cl and ch prefer λ = 1. Thus the Condorcet-winning precision is λ = 1 and there is no conflict
among consumers either. So to conclude, we see that if the producers engage in price competition
á la Bertrand, then there is no conflict over the precision of public information. In particular, the
Condorcet-winning and the expected consumers’ surplus maximizing precisions are both λ = 1, while
the producers are indifferent toward the precision of information.
6 Conclusion
We have studied majoritarian preference of consumers for the value of public information in a
symmetric Cournot oligopoly with uncertain marginal costs, homogeneous producers, and hetero-
geneous consumers. Although the uncertainty generates a mean-preserving spread in the expected
marginal costs, the spread in equilibrium prices and quantities – and thus in conditional expected
profit and expected consumers’ surplus – need not be mean-preserving. Consequently, while pro-
ducers and consumers are risk neutral, the value of more precise information may be positive for
producers, consumers, or both. Moreover, it may also be negative for producers or consumers,
but never for both. Importantly, more precise information can generate conflicts, between produc-
ers and consumers, or even amongst consumers, and we have identified the exact nature of such
conflicts. We have shown that majoritarian preference of consumers for public information about
cost uncertainties is well defined, thereby showing that representative consumer bodies will have
clear goals identified by the Condorcet-winning precision. We have then reported conditions on the
distribution of consumers’ valuations for the good such that the Condorcet-winning precision for
the consumers need not maximize either the expected consumers’ surplus or expected profits. In
such situations, majoritarian preference maximization for consumers hurts aggregate welfare. We
have also shown that the problem exists particularly under quantity competition but disappears
under price competition.
The results for quantity competition on profit and consumers’ surplus also extend to the case
where individual demand is not necessarily unitary. In particular, the proofs of Lemma 3 and
Proposition 4 do not rely upon aggregate demand comprising individuals with unit demands. For
the results on Condorcet-winning public information, the extension to the case where individual
consumers may purchase more than one unit (with diminishing marginal valuation) is more involved
and we leave for future research.13 Moreover, while our result for Bertrand competition is simple
13Non-unitary demand could pose a tough technical challenge to the problem. With unitary demand, we are
able to have a nice partition over the set of consumers to determine Condorcet-winning information. Without this
assumption, the set of consumers who prefer one information structure over the other could be erratic, and may not
be Lebesgue measurable.
19
and does not exhibit conflict, allowing for differentiated products could yield quite different results
as there is no reason to expect that conflict will not arise when goods are horizontally or vertically
differentiated. In addition, the model becomes significantly richer, as both the distribution of
valuations and a producer’s identity in the spectrum of goods supplied allow for the possibility
of conflict amongst producers as well. Another important question is whether the majoritarian
preference for consumers about public information remain well defined in the presence of private
information. Understanding that and relating it to the results obtained in Morris and Shin (2002),
Angeletos and Pavan (2007) or Cornand and Heinemann (2008) would be the next important step
towards our understanding of the social value of public information.
We have restricted our analysis to the simplest possible 2× 2 information structure (of binary
states and signals). Yet, the intuition that there is conflict over the precision of public information
between high-valuation and low-valuation consumers goes through with an arbitrary number of
states and signals. On the one hand, more precise information increases the variance of equilibrium
prices, which benefits low-valuation consumers as they get an opportunity to purchase and enjoy
a positive surplus. On the other hand, more precise information hurts high-valuation consumers if
and only if it leads to a higher expected price. Accordingly, one expects to obtain a clean partition
between consumers who prefer more precise information and those who prefer less. For this reason
we expect that the quasi-transitivity of the majoritarian preference will continue to hold. If so,
then by restricting attention to a finite set of public precisions and invoking footnote 10, one can
expect that a Condorcet winner exists with a more general information structure. This should be
particularly for the extension to (or perturbations around) an n × n, n > 2 precision matrix with
a single precision parameter λ where all diagonal elements are λ and all off-diagonal elements are
(1 − λ)/(n − 1). However, with a continuum of public precisions, one requires further research
to understand whether majoritarian preference still remains transfer-lower-continuous in order to
admit maximizers or some further characterizations of preferences are necessary to obtain a similar
conclusion.
As mentioned earlier, studying social preferences of consumers or producers can be useful in pro-
viding micro-foundations to the ideologies of interest groups that are central in the New Regulatory
Economics (see early surveys by Laffont and Tirole (1993) and Laffont (1994)). Interest groups are
modelled in a rudimentary form in that literature, usually consisting of a representative consumer
and a representative firm. While this simplifying assumption makes a model tractable by ignoring
the politics within the interest group, it brings two weaknesses to the existing framework. First,
assuming that there is a representative agent that pursues the common good for an interest group
eschews Arrow’s impossibility theorem of aggregating social preferences; hence it does not address
several important issues such as whom an interest group represents or for that matter whether a
majoritarian representative can at all have well-defined preferences. This is a legitimate concern
even if there are no actual voting events to determine representatives, as preference aggregation and
rightful representation can evolve through a process of repeated communication, either indirectly
through the press or directly through public demonstrations. Second, when an interest group’s
objective is exogenously given, it does not allow for an analysis about the determinants of the type
of interest a group represents with respect to the market structure. It is in these spheres that
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our results can be used to provide a social choice foundation to the preferences of consumer and
producer representatives as a function of the prevailing market conditions. We therefore view our
study to be useful for the next fundamental step towards developing a complete theory of regulatory
capture.
If it comes to a more comprehensive discussion on the political economy of demand for public
information in markets, we have essentially explored the foundational two-party Hotelling-Downs
model of elections through our characterization of the Condorcet winner under the standard as-
sumption that producers are countable and they do not possess additional electoral powers (so that
their preferences do not determine the location of the overall ‘median voter’). This sets the stage for
further investigation of the issue in richer electoral models with multiple parties, where parties may
have ideologies or cater to conflicting interest groups. Finally, the exercise undertaken in this paper
has shown how two different market structures lead to different properties of individual preferences
of the market participants over public information. It will be useful to understand this connection
in more general market games. We reserve these for the future.
7 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Lemma 1 is easy to establish: implicit differentiation of (1) yields the producer’s best responses to
a change in λ, given by
∂q∗(sl)
∂λ
=− ch − cl






(n+ 1)p′(nq∗(sh)) + nq∗(sh)p′′(nq∗(sh))
< 0,
(3)
where the signs follow from the assumption that r(x) < 2. To see this, note that if p′′ < 0 then the





2 . Since n ≥ 1, the right-hand side is larger than
p′′(nq)nq
n+1 and the result follows.
Of course, the signs for ∂p∗(s)/∂λ, s ∈ {sl, sh}, follow directly from the fact that the demand
function is downward sloping.
Proof of Proposition 1
(i) %maj is complete: Pick any λ, λ′ ∈ Λ. Without loss of generality, assume λ < λ′. By Lemma 1,
we have
p(nq∗(sl);λ
′) < p(nq∗(sl);λ) ≤ p(nq∗(sh);λ) < p(nq∗(sh);λ′).
Consumers with valuations v ≤ p(nq∗(sl);λ′) are indifferent between λ and λ′ as the expected utility
is zero in either case. Consumers with valuations v ∈ (p(nq∗(sl);λ′), p(nq∗(sl);λ)) strictly prefer λ′
to λ as they never purchase under λ but do so under λ′ whenever the signal is sl. Consumers with
valuations v ∈ (p(nq∗(sl);λ),p(nq∗(sh);λ)) strictly prefer λ′ to λ as they make a purchase only when
sl is observed and p(nq
∗(sl);λ
′) < p(nq∗(sl);λ). Consumers with valuations v ≥ p(nq∗(sh);λ′) are
indifferent between λ and λ′ when E(p∗;λ) = E(p∗;λ′), strictly prefer λ over λ′ when E(p∗;λ) <
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E(p∗;λ′), and strictly prefer λ′ over λ when E(p∗;λ) > E(p∗;λ′). Finally, for consumers with
valuations v ∈ [p(nq∗(sh);λ), p(nq∗(sh);λ′)), their expected utility under λ equals v − E(p∗;λ)
while under λ′ it equals 12(v − p(nq
∗(sl);λ
′)). If E(p∗;λ) ≥ E(p∗;λ′), then 12(v − p(nq
∗(sl);λ
′)) >
v−E(p∗;λ), and all consumers in this region strictly prefer λ′ to λ. On the other hand, if E(p∗;λ) <
E(p∗;λ′), it can be readily seen that all consumers with v ∈ [p(nq∗(sh);λ), 2E(p∗;λ)−p(nq∗(sl);λ′))
strictly prefer λ′ to λ, and consumers with v ∈ (2E(p∗;λ) − p(nq∗(sl);λ′), p(nq∗(sh);λ′)) strictly
prefer λ over λ′. Thus we have shown that
m({i ∈ I|λ′ i λ}) =

m((p(nq∗(sl);λ
′), 2E(p∗;λ)− p(nq∗(sl);λ′))) E(p∗;λ) < E(p∗;λ′)
m((p(nq∗(sl);λ
′), p(nq∗(sh);λ
′))) E(p∗;λ) = E(p∗;λ′)
m((p(nq∗(sl);λ
′),∞)) E(p∗;λ) > E(p∗;λ′)
and
m({i ∈ I|λ i λ′}) =

m((2E(p∗;λ)− p(nq∗(sl);λ′),∞)) E(p∗;λ) < E(p∗;λ′)
0 E(p∗;λ) = E(p∗;λ′)
0 E(p∗;λ) > E(p∗;λ′)
.
Clearly both m({i ∈ I|λ′i  λ}) and m({i ∈ I|λ i λ′}) are well defined, as all of the sets inside
m(·) above are Borel, i.e., they belong to BR+ . Accordingly, we have either m({i ∈ I|λ′ i λ}) ≥
m({i ∈ I|λ i λ′}) or m({i ∈ I|λ i λ′}) ≥ m({i ∈ I|λ′ i λ}), and hence %maj is complete.
(ii) %maj is quasi-transitive: From the proof of part (i), we observe that the following property
holds:
Claim 1 Let λ, λ′ ∈ Λ be such that λ < λ′. If λ %maj λ′ then E(p∗;λ) < E(p∗;λ′).
Let λ1, λ2 and λ3 be three distinct precisions from Λ, with
1
2 ≤ λ1 < λ2 < λ3 ≤ 1. To prove
the proposition, there are six possible cases to be considered:
Case I : λ1 maj λ2 and λ2 maj λ3 imply λ1 maj λ3: We establish the following slightly stronger
property: λ1 %maj λ2 and λ2 %maj λ3 imply λ1 maj λ3. From Claim 1, λ1 %maj λ2 and λ2 %maj λ3
imply E(p∗;λ1) < E(p
∗;λ2) < E(p
∗;λ3). Let v13 ∈ (p(nq∗(sh);λ1), p(nq∗(sh);λ3)) be the valuation
at which a consumer is indifferent between λ1 and λ3. Then
v13 − E(p∗;λ1) =
1
2
(v13 − p(nq∗(sl);λ3)) =⇒ v13 = 2E(p∗;λ1)− p(nq∗(sl);λ3).
Note that v13 is well defined given E(p
∗;λ1) < E(p
∗;λ3). It can then be readily verified that
m({i ∈ I|λ3 i λ1}) = m((p(nq∗(sl);λ3), v13))
and
m({i ∈ I|λ1 i λ3}) = m((v13,∞)).
By the same token, let v23 ∈ (p(nq∗(sh);λ2), p(nq∗(sh);λ3)) be the valuation at which a consumer




m({i ∈ I|λ3 i λ2}) = m((p(nq∗(sl);λ3), v23)),
and
m({i ∈ I|λ2 i λ3}) = m((v23,∞)).
As E(p∗;λ1) < E(p
∗;λ2), v13 < v23, which gives us
m({i ∈ I|λ2 i λ3}) < m({i ∈ I|λ1 i λ3}),
and
m({i ∈ I|λ3 i λ2}) > m({i ∈ I|λ3 i λ1}).
Accordingly, λ1 %maj λ2 and λ2 %maj λ3 imply λ1 maj λ3.
Case II : λ1 maj λ3 and λ3 maj λ2 imply λ1 maj λ2: We establish the following slightly stronger
property: λ1 %maj λ3 and λ3 maj λ2 imply λ1 maj λ2. First, we claim that λ1 %maj λ3 and
λ3 maj λ2 imply E(p∗;λ1) < E(p∗;λ2). Suppose to the contrary that λ1 %maj λ3 and λ3 maj λ2
but E(p∗;λ1) ≥ E(p∗;λ2). By Claim 1, we know that λ1 %maj λ3 implies E(p∗;λ1) < E(p∗;λ3).
We then have E(p∗;λ2) ≤ E(p∗;λ1) < E(p∗;λ3). Let vj3 ∈ (p(nq∗(sh);λj), p(nq∗(sh);λ3)) be the
valuation at which a consumer is indifferent between λj and λ3, j = 1, 2. Then
vj3 = 2E(p
∗;λj)− p(nq∗(sl);λ3), j = 1, 2.
Note that vj3 is well defined given E(p
∗;λj) < E(p
∗;λ3). Thus we have
m({i ∈ I|λ3 i λj}) = m((p(nq∗(sl);λ3), vj3))
and
m({i ∈ I|λj i λ3}) = m((vj3,∞)).
As λ1 %maj λ3, m((v13,∞)) ≥ m((p(nq∗(sl);λ3), v13)). Moreover, as we have assumed that
E(p∗;λ1) ≥ E(p∗;λ2), we get v13 ≥ v23, which in turn implies
m((p(nq∗(sl);λ3), v23)) ≤ m((p(nq∗(sl);λ3), v13)) ≤ m((v13,∞)) ≤ m((v23,∞)).
However, λ3 maj λ2 implies m((p(nq∗(sl);λ3), v23)) > m((v23,∞)), a contradiction. Therefore,
λ1 %maj λ3 and λ3 maj λ2 imply E(p∗;λ1) < E(p∗;λ2).
Now let v12 ∈ (p(nq∗(sh);λ1), p(nq∗(sh);λ2)) be the valuation at which a consumer is indifferent
between λ1 and λ2. Then
v12 = 2E(p
∗;λ1)− p(nq∗(sl);λ2).
Then, v12 is well defined given E(p
∗;λ1) < E(p
∗;λ2). Similarly, we have
m({i ∈ I|λ2 i λ1}) = m((p(nq∗(sl);λ2), v12))
and
m({i ∈ I|λ1 i λ2}) = m((v12,∞)).
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As λ2 < λ3, p(nq
∗(sl);λ2) > p(nq
∗(sl);λ3) and hence, v12 < v13. Accordingly,
m({i ∈ I|λ3 i λ1}) > m({i ∈ I|λ2 i λ1})
and
m({i ∈ I|λ1 i λ3}) < m({i ∈ I|λ1 i λ2}).
Therefore λ1 %maj λ3 and λ3 maj λ2 imply λ1 maj λ2.
Case III : λ2 maj λ1 and λ1 maj λ3 imply λ2 maj λ3: Suppose to the contrary that λ2 maj λ1
and λ1 maj λ3 but λ3 %maj λ2. From Case I, we conclude that λ1 maj λ3 and λ3 %maj λ2 imply
λ1 maj λ2, a contradiction. Thus, λ2 maj λ1 and λ1 maj λ3 imply λ2 maj λ3.
Case IV : λ2 maj λ3 and λ3 maj λ1 imply λ2 maj λ1: Suppose to the contrary that λ2 maj λ3
and λ3 maj λ1 but λ1 %maj λ2. Again we reach a contradiction as from Case I we conclude that
λ1 %maj λ2 and λ2 maj λ3 imply λ1 maj λ3. Therefore, λ2 maj λ3 and λ3 maj λ1 imply
λ2 maj λ1.
Case V : λ3 maj λ1 and λ1 maj λ2 imply λ3 maj λ2: Suppose to the contrary that λ3 maj λ1
and λ1 maj λ2 but λ2 %maj λ3. From Case I again, we conclude that λ1 maj λ2 and λ2 %maj λ3
imply λ1 maj λ3, a contradiction. Hence λ3 maj λ1 and λ1 maj λ2 imply λ3 maj λ2.
Case VI : λ3 maj λ2 and λ2 maj λ1 imply λ3 maj λ1: Suppose to the contrary that λ3 maj λ2
and λ2 maj λ1 but λ1 %maj λ3. From Case II, we conclude that λ1 %maj λ3 and λ3 maj λ2 imply
λ1 maj λ2, a contradiction. Accordingly, λ3 maj λ2 and λ2 maj λ1 imply λ3 maj λ1.
Remark 2 (%maj is not transitive) To see this, consider three precisions 12 ≤ λ1 < λ2 < λ3 ≤ 1
and suppose (A) λ1 ∼maj λ3 and (B) λ2 ∼maj λ3. Transitivity would imply that λ1 ∼maj λ2.
However, it turns out that λ2 maj λ1. This follows because (A) and (B) imply that E(p∗;λ1) =
E(p∗;λ2). But then by Claim 1, λ2 maj λ1.
(iii) %maj is transfer-lower-continuous: Pick any λ̃ ∈ Λ such that there exists some λ̂ ∈ Λ with
λ̂ maj λ̃. Consider two cases:
Case I. λ̃ > λ̂: As λ̂ maj λ̃, by Claim 1 we have E(p∗; λ̂) < E(p∗; λ̃). As established in part (i),
we have
m({i ∈ I|λ̂ i λ̃}) = m((2E(p∗; λ̂)− p(nq∗(sl); λ̃),∞))
and
m({i ∈ I|λ̃ i λ̂}) = m((p(nq∗(sl); λ̃), 2E(p∗; λ̂)− p(nq∗(sl); λ̃))).
Hence λ̂ maj λ̃ is equivalent to
m({i ∈ I|λ̂ i λ̃}) = m((2E(p∗; λ̂)− p(nq∗(sl); λ̃),∞)) >
m((p(nq∗(sl); λ̃), 2E(p
∗; λ̂)− p(nq∗(sl); λ̃))) = m({i ∈ I|λ̃ i λ̂}).
As both E(p∗;λ) and p(nq∗(sl);λ) are continuous in λ, λ̃ ∈ L̊%maj (λ̂), establishing that %maj is
transfer-lower-continuous in this case.
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Case II. λ̂ > λ̃: Analogous to Case I, by invoking continuity of E(p∗;λ) and p(nq∗(sl);λ),∞) in
λ, we can establish that λ̃ ∈ L̊%maj (λ̂) when either E(p∗; λ̂) < E(p∗; λ̃) or E(p∗; λ̂) > E(p∗; λ̃). So
consider the case when E(p∗; λ̂) = E(p∗; λ̃). Fix ε ∈ (0, λ̂ − λ̃) sufficiently small and consider a




λ ∈ N(λ̃), then λ̃ ∈ L̊%maj(λ̂).
Suppose for some
˜̃
λ ∈ N(λ̃), ˜̃λ %maj λ̂. From Claim 1 we know that E(p∗; ˜̃λ) < E(p∗; λ̂) = E(p∗; λ̃).
Moreover, as
˜̃
λ %maj λ̂ and λ̂ maj λ̃, (strong) quasi-transitivity implies
˜̃




λ > λ̃. As E(p∗;
˜̃
λ) < E(p∗; λ̃) and E(p∗; λ̃) is continuous in λ̃, there exists a neighborhood
of λ̃, O(λ̃), such that E(p∗;λ) > E(p∗;
˜̃
λ) for all λ ∈ O(λ̃). By Claim 1, ˜̃λ maj λ for all λ ∈ O(λ̃).





λ < λ̃. Since E(p∗;
˜̃
λ) < E(p∗; λ̃) and
˜̃
λ maj λ̃, analogous to Case I, both E(p∗; λ̃) and
p(nq∗(sl); λ̃) are continuous in λ̃ implies λ̃ ∈ L̊%maj(
˜̃
λ).
We have shown in both subcases λ̃ ∈ L̊%maj(
˜̃
λ). Therefore, %maj is transfer-lower-continuous.
The proof is completed now by noting the following. Mehta (Theorem 4, 1989) shows that an acyclic
and transfer-lower-continuous (but not necessarily complete) binary relation  on a compact set
X has a maximal element x ∈ X with respect to , i.e., there exists no y ∈ X with y  x. We
have so far shown that %maj is complete, quasi-transitive, and transfer-lower-continuous. Since
quasi-transitivity implies acyclicity, there exists a maximal element λ∗ ∈ Λ. As %maj is complete,
λ maj λ∗ is equivalent to λ∗ %maj λ for all λ ∈ Λ. Thus, λ∗ is a Condorcet-winning precision for
the consumers. This completes the proof of the Proposition. We end with the following remark.
Remark 3 (%maj need not be continuous) To see this, consider λ1 < λ2 with E(p;λ1) =
E(p;λ2). Then λ2 maj λ1. Consider now a small perturbation of λ1 to λ1 + ε. Suppose after
the perturbation we have E(p;λ1 + ε) < E(p;λ2). Then it is possible that λ1 + ε maj λ2 provided
that (see the proof of part (i) above)
m((2E(p∗;λ1 + ε)− p(nq∗(sl);λ2),∞)) > m((p(nq∗(sl);λ2), 2E(p∗;λ1 + ε)− p(nq∗(sl);λ2))).
Hence, the strict lower contour set is not open due to the discontinuity of m at E(p;λ1) = E(p;λ2).
In other words, discontinuity of m leads to the failure of lower continuity of %maj.

Proof of Lemma 2





















(n+ 1)p′(nq∗(sl)) + nq∗(sl)p′′(nq∗(sl))
−
np′(nq∗(sh))













The relation between E(p∗;λ) and r′ can now be easily verified. 
Proof of Proposition 2
(i) Let r′(·) ≥ 0. Pick any λ̃ ∈ [12 , 1). By Lemma 2, E(p
∗;λ = 1) ≤ E(p∗;λ = λ̃). By Claim 1,
λ = 1 maj λ = λ̃. Accordingly, the Condorcet-winning λ is λ = 1.
(ii) Let r′(·) < 0. Consider two cases:
Case I: L(n) > 0. For any λ̃ ∈ [12 , 1) denote by vλ̃1(n) the individual who is indifferent be-
tween λ = λ̃ and λ = 1 given the number of producers n. Clearly, vλ̃1(n) ∈
(
p(nq∗(sh;λ =
λ̃)), p(nq∗(sh;λ = 1))
)
since otherwise, the individual would either only purchase upon sl being
realized and so strictly prefer λ = 1, or would purchase regardless of the signal and so prefer
whichever yields the lower expected price. Thus, vλ̃1(n) is determined by:
vλ̃1(n)− E(p








Notice that individuals i for whom vi < vλ̃1(n), the left-hand side is strictly less than the right-hand
side so that (λ = 1) i (λ = λ̃), and, individuals j for whom vj > vλ̃1(n), the left-hand side is
strictly greater than the right-hand side so that (λ = λ̃) j (λ = 1).






If the former exceeds the latter, then (λ = 1) maj (λ = λ̃); whereas, if the latter exceeds the
former, then (λ = 1) maj (λ = λ̃).









































L(n) > 0 implies that the right-hand side of the first inequality is greater than the right-hand
side of the second inequality; but then, the left-hand side of the first inequality is necessarily greater
than the left-hand side of the second inequality, which implies that the Condorcet winner is λ = 1.
Case II: L(n) < 0. For any λ̃ ∈ (12 , 1] denote by v 1
2
λ̃(n) the individual who is indifferent between










since otherwise, the individual would either only purchase upon sl being realized and so strictly
prefer λ = λ̃, or would purchase regardless of the signal and so prefer whichever yields the lower
expected price. Thus, v 1
2

















Notice that individuals i for whom vi < v 1
2
λ̃(n), the left-hand side is strictly less than the right-hand
side so that (λ = λ̃) i (λ = 12), and, individuals j for whom vj > vλ̃1(n), the left-hand side is
strictly greater than the right-hand side so that (λ = 12) j (λ = λ̃).










If the former exceeds the latter, then (λ = λ̃) maj (λ = 12); whereas, if the latter exceeds the
former, then (λ = 12) maj (λ = λ̃).
Given r′ < 0, v 1
2
λ̃(n) is strictly increasing in λ̃ since p(nq
∗(sl;λ = λ̃)) is strictly decreasing in
λ̃. Hence, for every λ̃ ∈ (12 , 1], m
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L(n) < 0 implies that the left-hand side of the first inequality is less than the left-hand side of
the second inequality; but then, the right-hand side of the first inequality is necessarily less than
the right-hand side of the second inequality, which implies that the Condorcet winner is λ = 12 . 
Proof of Proposition 3
Part (i): Since limn→∞ p(nq
∗(sl;λ = 1)) = cl and limn→∞ v 1
2
1(n) = ch, we have
lim
n→∞
L(n) = p−1(cl)− 2p−1(ch).
Note that p−1(c) is the perfectly competitive output with marginal cost c. Using continuity prop-
erties of the demand function, the conclusion on the identity of the Condorcet winner with a large
number of producers can be readily obtained.
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Part (ii): Note that if for some n′, the Condorcet winner is λ = 1/2, then L′(n) ≤ 0 for all
n > n′ implies that the Condorcet winner remains at λ = 1/2 for all n′′ > n′. But the requirement






∂p(sl|n, λ = 1/2)
∂n



























Suppose demand is convex, that is p′′(x) > 0. Then the RHS of inequality (5) is strictly less than






≥ 1 if r′(x;n) < r(x;n)− 1
n(nq∗(n) + q∗(n))
.
Since r′ < 0 and nq∗(n) + q∗(n) > 0, if r > 1 then this condition is always true. But if p−1(cl) >
2p−1(ch) then Part (i) shows that for sufficiently large n, the Condorcet winner is λ = 1. This
means under these conditions, there can never be an n for which L(n) < 0.

Proof of Lemma 3
Using the Fundamental Theorem of Calculus and our previous result of equilibrium quantity


















( −p′(nq∗(sl))q∗(sl)(cl − ch)

















As q∗(sl) > q
∗(sh),
∂E(S|λ)
∂λ is positive or negative as
q









(n+ 1− r(nq)) + nqr′(nq)
(n+ 1− r(nq))2
.
Since r(nq) < 2 and n ≥ 1, the first term in the numerator is positive. If r′(x) ≥ 0, then the
second term is also positive. If 0 > r′(x) > r(x)−n−1x , then, although the second term is negative,
the numerator is positive, making this derivative positive. If r′(x) < r(x)−n−1x , then the numerator
is negative, making this derivative negative. 
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Proof of Proposition 4
Part (i): Upon observing sl, the monopolist produces q
∗(sl) and has conditional expected profit
(p(q∗(sl))−E(c|sl))q∗(sl). The first derivative of the monopolist’s conditional expected profit w.r.t.
λ is:
∂E(π(q|sl, n = 1))
∂λ








The first term is zero since its first factor vanishes by the first-order condition. Upon observing sh,
the first derivative of conditional expected profit w.r.t. λ is analogous and equals −∂E(c|sh)∂λ q
∗(sh).
Using the fact that ∂E(c|sl)∂λ = −
∂E(c|sh)
∂λ = cl − ch, the first derivative of the monopolist’s uncondi-




(q∗(sl)− q∗(sh)) > 0, (7)
where the sign follows since the monopolist produces more when its expected marginal cost is
smaller, that is, q∗(sl) > q
∗(sh).
Part (ii): Upon observing sl, in equilibrium, each producer produces q
∗(sl) and has conditional
expected profit (p(nq∗(sl))−E(c|sl))q∗(sl). Then, the first derivative of an oligopolist’s conditional
expected profit w.r.t. λ is:
∂E(π(q|sl))
∂λ





































Since the a priori probability of cl equals
1
2 , the first derivative of each producer’s unconditional













− (cl − ch)
2
(q∗(sl)− q∗(sh)). (8)















Dividing the numerator and denominator of the first term by p′(nq∗(sl)), and similarly for the














− (cl − ch)
2
(q∗(sl)− q∗(sh)). (9)
Let f ′(x) = n+1−r(x)+r
′(x)x
(n+1−r(x))2 . Multiplying the first term of (9) by
n
n , we can use the Mean-Value The-
orem (on the interval [nq∗(sh), nq
∗(sl)]) and guarantee the existence of some ξ ∈ [nq∗(sh), nq∗(sl)]
















(n− 1)f ′(ξ)− 1
)
. (10)
The sign of ∂E(π)∂λ is opposite that of the last factor (n−1)f
′(ξ)−1 which is negative if r′(x) < ρ̄(x, n)
but positive if r′(x) > ρ̄(x, n). Thus, ∂E(π)∂λ > 0 if r
′(x) < ρ̄(x, n) and ∂E(π)∂λ < 0 if r
′(x) > ρ̄(x, n).

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